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Abstract Improving structural racial equality for historically-disadvantaged Black 
South Africans, including low-skilled and unemployed adults and youths, is a 
pertinent challenge for the South African government during the ongoing transition 
from apartheid capitalism to post-apartheid capitalism. Within the framework of the 
National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS), the introduction of ''learnerships'' and 
''learning programmes'', which include structured learning programmes, lear-
nerships, apprenticeships and skills programmes, has had some impact. But 
emerging theoretical perspectives assert that apartheid structural racial inequalities 
persist and that structural reform is imperative. Opposing positions translate into two 
perspectives on social transition: either capitalism can be de-racialised, or capitalism 
in South Africa should be dismantled in order to de-racialise it. After a review of 
relevant literature and governmental documents, the author identifies five structural 
and pedagogical barriers as likely causes for low completion rates of skills 
development courses and concludes that structural reform needs more favourable 
political and economic conditions in order to be successful. 
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Resume Developpement des competences et reforme structurelle: possibilites et 
limites dans la reduction des inegalites raciales structurelles en Afrique du Sud - 
Ameliorer l'egalite raciale structurelle pour les Sud-Africains noirs, traditionnell- 
ement defavorises et constitues en majorite de jeunes et d'adultes sans emploi et peu 
qualifies, est un important defi pour le gouvernement sud-africain actuel lors de cette 
transition du capitalisme de l'apartheid a un capitalisme post-apartheid. Dans le 
cadre de la strategie nationale de developpement des competences (NSDS), 
l'introduction de « groupes d'apprentissage » et de « programmes educatifs » , 
comprenant des programmes d'apprentissage structure, l'apprentissage alterne en 
groupes, l'apprentissage professionnel et des programmes de qualification, a obtenu 
uncertain nombre de resultats. Mais les nouveaux points de vue theoriques affir- 
ment que les inegalites raciales inherentes aux structures de l'apartheid persistent et 
qu'une reforme structurelle est indispensable. Les positions opposees se traduisent 
par deux visions de la transition sociale : d'un cote le capitalisme peut etre dera- 
cialise, de l'autre le capitalisme sud-africain doit etre demantele pour etre dera- 
cialise. Apres un examen de la documentation afferente et des documents officiels, 
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l'auteure identifie cinq obstacles structurels et pedagogiques comme les causes 
probables des faibles taux d'achevement obtenus par les cours de developpement des  
competences; elle conclut que pour reussir cette reforme structurelle, des conditions 
politiques et economiques plus favorables sont necessaires. 
 
Introduction 
Apartheid capitalist political economy created structural racial inequalities1 in all 
spheres of South African society. When the African National Congress government 
under Nelson Mandela came to power through the democratic elections in 1994, there 
was huge expectation among the historically-disadvantaged Black majority that 
apartheid inequalities would be eradicated, and that their lives would improve 
dramatically. As it turns out, several simultaneous converging and diverging 
transitions from apartheid capitalism to post-apartheid capitalism2 have ensued and, 
in the process, determined the possibilities and limitations for redressing inequalities 
in skills development and unemployment. While these transitions were rooted in a 
long struggle against apartheid and colonialism, they were also influenced by 
neo-liberal globalisation which has swept across the world since the 1980s and 
created a need for skills development to facilitate transnational economic trade and 
exchanges. As a consequence, government and non-government institutions in many 
countries, including South Africa, have incorporated skills development into their 
educational policies and organisational arrangements. Thus skills development has 
emerged as a research interest in the study of comparative and international 
education policies and practices. 
 
This article examines the question, ''What possibilities and limitations have the 
transitions from apartheid capitalism to post-apartheid capitalism created for 
redressing structural racial inequalities in terms of skills development and 
unemployment?'' In pursuit of this question, this article reviews relevant literature 
related to (1) international developments impacting political and economic change in 
South Africa; (2) political and economic change in South Africa; (3) skills 
development in South Africa; and (4) adult education in South Africa. In addition, 
this paper analyses important government policy documents related to skills 
development as well as the Department of Labour's annually-published National 
Skills Development Strategy: Implementation Report for the period 2001-2007. 
These reports capture the official statistics related to the South African government's 
implementation of skills development initiatives. 
 
Theoretical perspectives on transitional political and economic changes serve as a 
framework in this paper for analysing the changes made by the South African 
government in terms of skills development and unemployment affecting Black, low- 
skilled and unemployed adults and youth. There is evidence that completion rates in 
                                            
1 The word "structural" in the term structural racial inequality refers to the idea that racial inequality was etched into all 
apartheid political and economic structures. 
2 In this article I use ''post-apartheid capitalism" for easy reference to "capitalism in a post-apartheid society''. 
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these skills development programmes are still low today and that access to 
employment is limited. Arguing that racial inequality was etched into all apartheid 
political and economic structures, that barriers to skills development are structural, 
unemployment is structural and binding constraints on growth are structural, this 
paper asserts that structural transformation is required to redress structural racial 
inequalities. The article draws attention to the structure of the shrinking post- 
apartheid capitalist economy which favours skilled labour over low-skilled labour and 
thus reproduces structural racial inequalities. 
 
The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the debates about structural reform 
which could create political and economic conditions facilitating a change in the lives 
of Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth. 
 
Transitions from apartheid capitalism to post-apartheid capitalism: 
possibilities and limitations for redressing apartheid inequalities 
Changing the lives of historically-disadvantaged Black South Africans, including 
Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth, is a pertinent challenge for the 
South African government during the transition from the apartheid political 
economy. Over the past two decades several prominent academics and researchers 
have analysed this transition from different theoretical perspectives. These include 
Jonathan Michie and Vishnu Padayachee (1997) and Hein Marais (1998), who focus 
on the ''political economy of transition''; Patrick Bond (2000), who analyses the 
post-1994 changes as ''an elite transition''; Glenn Adler and Edward Webster (2001), 
who coined the term ''double transition''; Zine Magubane (2004), who asked: ''The 
revolution betrayed?'' and Mashupye Maserumule (2011), who highlighted the 
importance of the ''politics of transition''. 
 
I find these well-constructed and widely-cited perspectives pertinent to explain that 
in fact several transitions from apartheid capitalism have occurred, prompting the 
emergence of a post-apartheid capitalist society manifesting multiple polities such as 
elite rule, liberalism, neo-liberalism, liberal democracy and social democracy. The 
discussion below constitutes a framework for analysing the possibilities and 
limitations that the transitions from apartheid capitalism to post- apartheid 
capitalism have presented for redressing apartheid structural racial inequalities 
affecting Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth in terms of skills 
development and employment. 
 
Apartheid capitalism and structural racial inequalities 
Debates which ensued in the 1980s about the characterisation of apartheid capitalism 
serve as a reminder of those features of the apartheid structures which must be 
changed in order to address structural racial inequalities. Two positions epitomised 
the opposite ends of the debates. At one end is the view that that there is a 
contradictory relationship between capitalism and racial domination (Saul and Gelb 
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1986), while the other end argues that there is a contingent relationship between 
capitalism and racism (Wolpe 1988). 
John S. Saul and Stephen Gelb describe the relationship between capitalism and 
racial domination as follows: 
 
Thus for extended periods of time, the structure of racial domination has 
interpenetrated with and reinforced the structure of capitalist exploitation, 
producing what we have called a system of racial capitalism. Yet it need come as 
no surprise that this linkage between racial domination and capitalist exploitation 
is as potentially contradictory as, for long stretches of time in South Africa, it has 
been mutually reinforcing (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 12). 
 
By contrast, Harold Wolpe asserts that there is a ''contingent relationship between 
capitalism and racism in South Africa'', 
 
that does not begin with a concept of racial capitalism, but nevertheless argues that 
the correlation of forces is such as to render it impossible for racial domination to 
become detached from capitalist relations. That is to say, while in principle 
capitalism and racialism are inseparable, the interpenetration which has occurred 
in practice and, most importantly, the vested interest of powerful groups and class 
forces in racial domination, are such as to make the de-racialisation of capitalism 
unrealisable (Wolpe 1988, p. 32). 
 
These opposing positions translate into two perspectives on social transition: either 
capitalism can be de-racialised, or capitalism in South Africa should be dismantled in 
order to de-racialise it. Three kinds of transitions from apartheid capitalism to 
post-apartheid capitalism are considered in the next section: liberal, neo-liberal and 
social democratic. 
 
Elite transition to post-apartheid liberal capitalism 
The redress of apartheid racial inequalities may be the most critical challenge the 
democratic government should have considered when they came to power in 1994. 
Therefore the earliest critiques that focused on ''elite transition'' and incorporated a 
small number of Blacks seem relevant to understanding how the redress of apartheid 
racial inequalities that affected the lives of the historically-disadvantaged Black 
majority had receded from prominence. Webster and Adler (1999) argue that an elite 
transition, negotiated through social contracts and pacts, has circumvented a 
fundamental transformation. They contend that elite sectors, in their formation as 
''the elite'', and the elite, capital and international capital in their respective alliances, 
have engineered the transition in their favour. They draw on the ideas of John Pilger 
(1998, p. 602), who captured the sense of disillusionment on the left when he 
lamented that an ''historic compromise'' between the African National Congress 
(ANC) and the apartheid government left economic power in the hands of the 
corporate White elite. All that has changed is the ''inclusion of a small group of Blacks 
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into this masonry'' (Webster and Adler 1999, p. 347). In the same way, Bond 
describes post-1994 changes as ''elite transition'' that was secured through social 
contracts, pacts and compromises between the old White elite and the new Black 
elite, and between the newly-formed elite, capital and labour (Bond 2000). 
 
Likewise, Solomon Johannes Terreblanche3 argues that a Black and predominantly 
African elite is in control of government, while Guy Mhone claims that the Black elite 
is a ''junior partner'' and that White domination still reigns. Terreblanche explains, 
''The transformation of colonial capitalism into a first- world capitalist enclave has 
coincided with the introduction of a system of representative democracy which is 
effectively controlled by a Black, predominantly African elite'' (Terreblanche 2002, p. 
422). In support of his claim that the elite transition has been shaped by race, and 
referring to Mhone (2000), he asserts that, ''Although the Black elite - both the 
bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie - has been adopted as a junior partner, the new 
system has retained its racist character: it still is a White-controlled enclave in a sea of 
Black poverty'' (Terreblanche, p. 422). Building on Mhone, Terreblanche constructs a 
relationship between elite dominance, race and capitalism which he moulds into a 
political configuration and describes in the following way: 
 
The politico-economic system that has replaced White political domination and 
colonial and racial capitalism is a liberal capitalist version of democratic 
capitalism, that can best be described as a system of African elite democracy cum 
capitalist enclavity. A new symbiotic relationship has been forged between the 
mainly White corporate elite and the Black governing elite in which the former is 
very much the senior partner and the latter very much the junior and dependent 
partner (ibid., p. 423). 
 
Thus it can be argued that the emergence of a Black elite and its incorporation into 
the White corporate elite indicates that some features of apartheid capitalism have 
been de-racialised. However it is clear that these changes have benefited the Black 
elite itself, and have not necessarily increased the possibilities of redressing structural 
racial inequalities which could benefit the historically-disadvantaged Black majority. 
 
Transition to post-apartheid neo-liberal capitalism 
As the transitions took shape in one form or another, and it became apparent that the 
elite had opted for neo-liberalism, several thinkers developed theoretical perspectives 
on the transition from apartheid capitalism to post-apartheid neo-liberal capitalism 
(Webster and Adler 1999; Alexander 2003; Bond 2000, 2011a; Marais 1998, 2001, 
2011). In reflecting on the transition to neo-liberalism, Bond traces the evolution of 
neo-liberalism in the ANC to ''a neo-liberal faction within the ANC [which] had 
                                            
3 S. J. Terreblanche is among the analysts who have used both ''representative democracy'' and ''liberal democratic capitalism'' 
to characterise South Africa's democracy. The differences and similarities between these terms are not always clear. For the 
purposes of the discussion here, I have not attempted to delve into, or derive, the author's understandings of these different 
characterisations, but worked within his general assertion that through the 1994 election, democratic institutions, policies and 
procedures have been established. 
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emerged around Thabo Mbeki, Trevor Manuel, Tito Mboweni, Alec Erwin, ultimately 
persuading President Mandela (1994-99) to adopt a series of structural adjustment  
and sectoral adjustment programs fully in line with the Washington consensus'' 
(Bond 2011a, p. 355). Neo-liberalism, according to James Ferguson, deploys 
government structures to the benefit of the market, ''so that even core functions of the 
state are either subcontracted out to private providers, or run (as the saying has it) 
'like a business''' (Ferguson 2009, p. 172). Revealing evidence of the transition from 
apartheid capitalism to post-apartheid neo-liberal capitalism lies in the neo-liberal 
principles of the government's Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
strategy, which Marais describes as ''deficit reduction, keeping inflation in the single 
digits, trade liberalization, privatization, tax cuts and holidays, phasing out of 
exchange controls etc.'' (Marais 1998, p. 171). 
 
As expectation continued that post-apartheid economic changes would benefit the 
Black majority, several critiques of neo-liberalism have emerged over the years. 
Magubane laments, ''There is no question that neo-liberalism has failed in terms of its 
announced goals, particularly in terms of bringing about rapid economic growth, 
reduced poverty, or economic stability'' (Magubane 2004, p. 665). On the outcomes 
of the transition to neo-liberalism, Bond remarks that ''the framework of neo-liberal, 
low-intensity democracy, the secretly negotiated terms of elite transition provided 
benefits for a few hundred at the top of the three divergent interest groups: White 
Afrikaners, White English-speaking business and the liberation movement'' (Bond 
2011b, p. 115). 
According to these critiques, liberalism, neo-liberalism and liberal democracy have 
not created the conditions to redress apartheid structural racial inequalities in ways 
that could radically transform the lives of the historically-disadvantaged Black 
majority. As a consequence it could be argued that a transition to social democracy 
may create greater possibilities for redressing apartheid structural racial inequalities. 
 
Transition to post-apartheid social democratic capitalism 
Webster and Adler (1999), Marais (2001) and Terreblanche (2002) are among 
thinkers who promote social democracy as an alternative to neo-liberalism. In 
questioning whether the British-American version of democratic capitalism premised 
upon the ideology of liberal democracy suits the developmental needs of developing 
countries like South Africa, Terreblanche proposes ''a social democratic version of 
democratic capitalism'' (Terreblanche 2002, p. 477). 
 
Webster and Adler (1999) used the conundrum ''double transition'' to describe the 
political and economic changes which occurred during the 1990s and around the time 
of the 1994 elections in South Africa. They propose that class compromise is the 
antidote to counteract a conservative pact emanating from the double transition 
which is seen in ''states that are simultaneously consolidating democracy and 
reconstructing their economies'' (ibid., p. 348). Following Adam Przeworski et al. 
(1995) and the example of Kerala state (India), they promote ''social democracy as an 
7 
 
alternative to neo-liberalism'' through which two compromises will be bargained, ''a 
social wage to all citizens'' and increased influence by workers over key economic 
decisions ''to ensure that surpluses generated by growth benefit the population as a 
whole'' (Webster and Adler 1999, p. 357). Well-known for his thinking about 
transitions to democracy, Przeworski contends that ''The fundamental premise of 
social democracy is that nationalization of the means of production is not necessary 
to overcome the irrationality of capitalism, that is, to avoid the welfare losses caused 
by the rights inherent in private ownership of the means of production'' (Przeworski 
1991, p. 132). 
 
Although there have been continuous prompts for social democracy in South Africa, it 
is critical to note that these are informed by different political and economic 
perspectives, both in terms of the rationale and the processes for achieving the 
alternative. Class compromise is the process which Webster and Adler (1999) 
envision for the attainment of a social democracy, while Terreblanche proposes that 
the governing elite orient themselves towards the ''common good'', which he 
considers a ''basic precept of democracy'' (Terreblanche 2002, p. 463). Terreblanche 
(2002) and Webster and Adler (1999) agree that social democracy has not been 
achieved. This is in contrast to others, notably Alan Hirsch (2005), who asserts that 
the South African government has shifted to social democracy. Although social 
democracy and a ''social democratic vision'' are represented in former President 
Mbeki's ''two nations'' thesis,4 Stephen Gelb expresses little confidence that it would 
yield its proposed equality (Gelb 2003, pp. 54-56). The expression of the ''two 
nations'' perspective has manifested as a ''two economies'' concept, in the formulation 
and implementation of the Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative in South Africa 
(ASGI-SA) in 2006. However, binding constraints on shared growth limited the 
potential successes of the ASGI-SA (Dube et al. 2007). Haroon Bhorat et al. (2002) 
refer to South Africa as a ''lean social democracy'', but do not provide an elaborated 
conceptualisation of the latter. Likewise, Paul Benjamin (2006) makes bold reference 
to it, but also does not detail the notion of a ''lean social democracy''. 
 
Taking into consideration these different theoretical perspectives, it becomes 
apparent that as the post-apartheid capitalist society has evolved, its political features 
have been characterised in multiple ways that include liberalism, neo- liberalism, 
liberal democracy and social democracy. The ways in which these different features 
coexist are explained well by Ferguson in his references to the Basic Income Grant 
(BIG)5 that has been implemented in South Africa (Ferguson 2009, p. 176). He 
purports that an interwoven multiplicity of rationalities underpins the rationales for 
                                            
4 Thabo Mbeki declared his ''two nations thesis'' in his address to the National Council of Provinces on 11 November 2003, 
arguing that South Africa was characterised by two parallel economies, the First and the Second. He described these as 
follows, ''The First Economy is modern, produces the bulk of our country's wealth, and is integrated within the global 
economy. The Second Economy (or the Marginalised Economy) is characterised by underdevelopment, contributes little to the 
GDP, contains a big percentage of our population [...] and is incapable of self-generated growth and development" (Mbeki 
2003). 
5 The Basic Income Grant (BIG) is a form of social assistance paid by the government to all vulnerable South Africans. For 
further information, see DSD (2002). 
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the BIG, such as ''traditional welfare-state arguments'', and ''Keynesian arguments'' 
that ''lie side by side with others, which are markedly different from social democratic 
reasoning, and surprisingly similar to the neo- liberal rationality that we more usually 
associate with anti-welfare discourses'' (ibid., p. 176). He expands this idea by stating 
his interest ''in identifying some surprising ways in which certain discursive 'moves' 
that we can readily identify as neo-liberal are being put to work in the service of 
apparently pro-poor and pro- welfare political arguments'' (ibid., p. 176). 
 
Post-apartheid capitalism is complex and convergences and divergences are apparent 
among the different rationalities that operate simultaneously. This is the nature of the 
post-apartheid capitalism in which government and several institutions in South 
Africa are redressing apartheid inequalities in terms of skills development and 
unemployment. Notwithstanding the credibility and relevance of the arguments 
about the different rationalities, I wish to point out that above all, capitalism still 
prevails and remains an important dimension in my analyses of current and future 
transitions in this article. 
 
The next question is ''To what extent have the transitions from apartheid capitalism 
to post-apartheid capitalism provided the conditions to redress apartheid structural 
racial inequalities in terms of skills development and unemployment?'' In addressing 
this question, it is useful to look at some socio-political and economic conditions in 
the apartheid capitalist society which marginalised Black people in terms of skills, 
employment and income, and prevailed around 1994. 
 
Skills levels, division of labour, employment/unemployment and income 
inequalities as of 1994 
Saul and Gelb's analysis of developments in the 1960s and 1970s, captured in the 
following statement, provides an historical backdrop for this section, 
 
A permanently high rate of Black unemployment was, Legassick and Wolpe argue, 
an important condition of the postwar emergence of secondary industry. The large 
reserve army of unemployed was crucial in facilitating the reinforcement of the 
exploitation color bar, allowing the ''living wage'' for Blacks to be pegged at little 
more than the physical subsistence in the reserves, while compounding the 
difficulties of working-class organization (already restricted by harsh legislation). 
Yet, as even the very high growth rates of the 1960s failed to create sufficient jobs 
to absorb the growing labor force (partly because of a bias toward capital-intensive 
investment), unemployment rose steeply, reaching over 12 percent in 1970 and 
defining a looming political threat. As then-Prime Minister John Vorster noted: 
''The biggest danger in South Africa today is not terrorism, but unemployment'' 
(Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 71). 
 
By 1994 there was convincing evidence that under apartheid, conditions created a 
significant majority of low-skilled Black people who occupied low-ranking jobs. Mark 
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Orkin's statistical analysis of the occupations of people employed in the formal 
economy in 1996 shows that 50 per cent of African females were employed in 
low-ranking, menial jobs, in comparison with almost 50 per cent of White women 
who were in clerical work. Sixty-six per cent of White men were in management, 
blue-collar and semi-professional jobs. A further breakdown of Orkin's statistics 
shows that amongst employed Africans, 34% of males and 50% of females are 
working in elementary occupations such as cleaning, garbage collecting and 
agricultural labour. A further 20% of African males are in operator, assembler and 
related occupations, for example they are working as assembly-line operators. 
Approximately 20% of African females are in semi-professional occupations, for 
example nursing assistants. Fewer than 4% of African males and 2% of African 
females are in managerial posts'' (Orkin 1996, p. 18). 
 
His analysis also shows that 
 
Whites, on the other hand, particularly White males, tend to have access to 
occupations requiring higher levels of competencies. White males tend to be found 
in three main occupational categories, management (19%), blue-collar jobs (29%), 
semi-professional/technical category (17%). White females, however, tend to be 
found largely in clerical occupations (47%) (ibid., p. 18). 
 
These structural class, race and gender inequalities in the distribution of occupations 
reflect the class, race and gender patterns which characterise income inequality. By 
1994 synergies between colonialism, apartheid and racial capitalism had created a 
society in which political, economic and social conditions had relegated Black people 
to the lowest echelons of the labour force, who were occupying the most menial, and 
the lowest-paid jobs, and earning the lowest incomes. An analysis of structural 
income inequality in the early 1990s reveals race and gender inequalities in the 
composition of South Africa's poor population, high income inequalities between 
White and African people, and that African people were poorest. The average income 
of 68.6 per cent of African workers was less than R1, 600 a month, and the average 
income of 65 per cent of workers within the White population was between R3,201 
and R25,600 (UNDP 2003, p. 148). Julian May, in a study on poverty and inequality, 
claims that in 1993, 50 per cent of the population could be considered poor (May 
2000, p. xiii). This resonates with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), whose researchers for the purpose of their study used the South African 
government's Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) of 1995 to establish a national 
poverty line of R354 per month per adult for 1995 (Statistics South Africa 1995). 
Using this unit of analysis, the UNDP deduced that in 1995, 20.2 million people were 
living below the poverty line (UNDP 2003, p. 41). 
 
Income inequality is determined, among other factors, by unemployment. 
Unsurprisingly, given South Africa's apartheid history, statistics reveal that access to 
employment continues to reflect race and gender inequalities. Given the low levels of 
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skills among Black people occupying low-paid jobs, the projections for employment 
and unemployment are telling. Statistical analysis shows that of the 14.4 million who 
were economically active in 1995 (Orkin 1996, p. 13) ''African economically active 
women are most likely to be unemployed (47%), followed by African males (29%), 
and then by coloured women (28%). White females (8%) and males (4%) are least 
likely to be unemployed'' (Orkin 1996, p. 15). 
 
As illustrated earlier, low-skilled Black people access low-income jobs and have 
limited opportunities for any employment. Premised on the argument that higher 
skills levels can increase employability, access to employment and access to higher- 
waged jobs, the post-1994 government set up a non-racial, non-sexist system that 
expands access to skills development opportunities for Black people. 
 
Skills development and structural changes: promises, targets and 
outcomes 
Wolpe's poignant description of the racial features of apartheid capitalism reads as 
follows: 
 
It is clear that race is inscribed in the institutional and organisational structures at 
every level of the political and economic system. Race is, thus, a critical ingredient 
of the political and economic structure but, as has been argued throughout, it by no 
means exhausts the account of what is significant to the functioning of those 
structures (Wolpe 1988, p. 63). 
 
This serves as a point of reference in considering the kinds of changes that the post- 
1994 government instituted to redress structural racial inequalities. Some literature 
(Groener 1997, 2000; Badroodien 2004; Kraak 2004b; McGrath 2004) sketches the 
history of apartheid, training and skills development. The skills crisis itself is 
discussed by Andre Kraak (2004b, 2005) and Simon McGrath (2004), work which is 
pertinent to understanding post-1994 changes of the apartheid forms of training. 
Under apartheid, the Department of Manpower (DOM) 6  coordinated a racially- 
defined system of training governed by the Manpower Training Act (DOL 1981). 
Institutional arrangements under the apartheid government reflect the racially- 
defined systems of delivery, comprising the DOM, which delivered training for White 
people, and, to some extent, for Indian and Coloured people. The homeland 
governments provided vocational training for African people. These apartheid 
institutional structures created structural racial inequalities between the provision of 
higher-standard and well-resourced training for White people, and low-standard, 
under-resourced training for Black people. 
 
                                            
6 ''The Department of Manpower (DoM) was supposedly in charge of co-ordinating all matters relating to the training of 
workers in the private sector. However, there were separate manpower departments in each of the nominally independent 
homelands. In addition, the administration of training for local authorities, the public sector and some parastatals were handled 
by these structures independently of the DoM'' (Kraak 2004a, p. 51). 
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Post-1994 changes in skills development 
Several authors have researched post-1994 changes in skills development. Among 
others, Azeem Badroodien (2004) assessed the size of the problem; Marina Mayer 
and Miriam Altman (2005) outlined the implications for skills development and 
South Africa's economic development trajectory; and Andre Kraak (2004a) described 
the National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS) in post-apartheid South Africa. As 
the literature attests, the post-1994 government aimed to redress the structural racial 
inequalities by expanding the hitherto limited and under- resourced provision of 
training through expanding provision for Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults 
and youth. 
 
Several new policies were introduced by the post-1994 government, which include the 
Green Paper Skills Development Strategy for Economic and Employment Growth in 
South Africa (Office of the President 1997); the Skills Development Act (Office of the 
President 1998a); the Skills Levies Act (Office of the President 1998b); and the NSDS 
2001-2010 launched in 2001.7 Also of importance are the government's White Paper 
on Reconstruction and Development (Office of the President 1994); and the Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution document (Office of the President 1996), since these 
have presented the broad political and economic frameworks within which the 
government has formulated its skills development policies. The government created 
new sources of funding by instituting an imposed skills levy on particular kinds of 
organisations. These levies are channelled into the National Skills Fund (NSF), and 
the Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) are among those who 
distribute these funds for skills development programmes.8 Through the SETAs the 
government has established a system of providing skills development programmes, 
such as learnerships,9 learning programmes and skills programmes. 
 
Promises and equity targets 
As the government instituted changes, they made promises and set targets to achieve 
equity. A promise ''to redress those disadvantages through training and education'' is 
explicit in one of the purposes of the Skills Development Act (DOL 1998, pp. 4-5). 
Further promises to redress inequalities through skills development are expressed in 
the equity targets which are captured in the NSDS (DOL 2006a). The promises of 
equity through skills development for designated groups, defined as Black people, 
women, and people with disabilities, are stated clearly in the NSDS Implementation 
Reports. The South African Department of Labour (DOL) declares that ''equity 
targets underpin every objective of the NSDS. These targets state that the 
                                            
7 The National Skills Development Strategy (NSDS) was divided into two phases: NSDS I (2001-2005); NSDS II 
(2005-2010). In the meantime, NSDS III (2011-2016) has been implemented. 
8 Established in the Skills Development Act in 1998, the National Skills Fund (NSF) is is a fund located within the 
Department of Labour. The Sector Education and Training Authorities (SETAs) are regional branches of a vocational skills 
training organisation in South Africa, responsible for managing and creating learnerships, internships, unit-based skills 
programmes, and apprenticeships within their jurisdiction. 
9 Learnerships, discussed in more detail later on in this paper, are fixed-term legal contracts between a learner, an employer 
and a training provider. The scheme of learnerships (2001-2005) was followed by the scheme of learning programmes 
(2005-2007) which include structured learning programmes, learnerships, apprenticeships and skills programmes. 
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beneficiaries of the strategy should be 85% Black, 54% female and 4% people with 
disabilities'' (DOL 2003, p. 48). This commitment was re-stated in 2006 in the 
following way: ''The achievement of equity targets in the NSDS 2005-2010 is 
therefore critical to the previously-disadvantaged'' (DOL 2006b, p. 32). ''Unemployed 
youth'' was added as a designated group in the NSDS 2005-2010 (ibid., p. 32). The 
identification of these designated groups and equity targets implies that the NSDS 
aims to redress social inequalities which arise from class, race, gender, disability, and 
employment status - between ruling class, middle class, working class; African, 
coloured, Indian and White; men and women; able-bodied and disabled; and 
employed adults and unemployed youth. 
 
Despite this explicit political and moral commitment to address inequalities, skills 
development outcomes in South Africa are not encouraging 20 years after the 
democratic elections. Several years have passed since the promulgation and 
implementation of the post-1994 skills development policies. There has been some 
progress. Reports on post-1994 delivery indicate that skills development has 
succeeded in redressing inequalities related to opportunities for skills development to 
a limited extent. Dismantling the racially-defined system of vocational education and 
training has eliminated some of the structural racial inequalities which created, for 
Black people, structural barriers to access skills development opportunities. The 
DOL's own assessment of its successes and failures in terms of selected objectives and 
principles in instructive. In its NSDS, the DOL identified objectives against which it 
has monitored and evaluated its performance. These were modified in 2005 to 
incorporate ''designated groups'' more consciously in terms of learning programmes 
and employment, evident in Objective 4, ''Assisting designated groups, including new 
entrants, to participate in accredited work, integrated learning and work-based 
programmes to acquire critical skills to enter the labour market and 
self-employment'' (DOL 2006b, p. iii). The relationship between the equity targets in 
relation to broader political and economic goals is conveyed in the following 
statement: ''These five objectives10  are central to the achievement of the overall 
objective of the strategy, which is to contribute towards halving unemployment and 
poverty, and reducing inequality by 2014'' (ibid., p. viii). 
 
Equity targets for designated groups: impact 
Are equity targets for access by designated groups being met? For NSDS II the DOL 
identified guiding principles, among others, Principle No. 3, the ''Achievement of 
Equity Targets'', as criteria against which to monitor and evaluate its progress 
towards redressing inequalities (DOL 2007a, p. 41). Their assessment of progress has 
                                            
10 The five objectives of the National Skills Development Strategy II (2005-2010) referred to here are (1) Prioritising and 
communicating critical skills for sustainable growth, development and equity; (2) Promoting and accelerating quality training 
for all in the workplace; (3) Promoting employability and sustainable livelihoods through skills development; (4) Assisting 
designated groups, including new entrants to participate in accredited work, integrated learning and work-based programmes 
to acquire critical skills to enter the labour market and self-employment; and (5) Improving the quality and 
Footnote 10 continued 
relevance of provision. These have been modified and changed from the objectives of the National Skills Development 
Strategy I (2001-2005). 
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presented evidence that during the period 2001-2008 very few promised equity 
targets were met. While there has been some advancement during this period, a grim 
picture has emerged from the DOL's revealing statements. In 2004 some changes 
were reported by the DOL, claiming ''slow progress towards meeting the equity 
targets'' (DOL 2004, p. 62). Some successes were acknowledged: ''There has [sic] 
been some clear improvements in this regard during 2003/04'' (ibid., p. 62), but the 
following year the DOL declared a ''general dissatisfaction with regard to the 
achievement of equity targets'' (DOL 2005, p. 60). 2007 reports conveyed shocking 
messages that ''no equity targets were met'' (DOL 2007a, p. 41); ''equity targets in all 
categories could not be met in the 2006/07 financial year'' (ibid., p. 44); and none of 
the targets were realised (DOL 2008, p. 59). In terms of equity targets, ''SETAs are 
still trailing behind. There is however an improvement in the percentage of people 
with disabilities entering and completing learning programmes'' (DOL 2007a, p. 30). 
This is disconcerting as the government has placed SETAs at the helm of redressing 
inequalities in terms of skills development. 
 
Evidence over the years 2002-07 arising from their evaluation of equity targets in 
terms of race, gender and disability gives further insights. Women remain at the 
margins, according to the DOL's statement that, ''similarly women are also still 
excluded from apprenticeship and, to some extent, other learning opportunities'' 
(DOL 2003, p. 52). Limited achievement of race and gender targets was reported in 
2004 and 2005 (DOL 2004, p. 62; DOL 2005, p. 60). Black disabled people remained 
at the margins of the government's equity achievements. This is revealed in the 
admission, ''In particular none of the disability targets are currently being met in 
areas where Black people have historically been disadvantaged (e.g. in structured 
learning opportunities and completion of apprenticeships)'' (DOL 2003, p. 52). Given 
the high rate of low literacy among Black adults, failure to achieve equity targets led 
to the Director-General of Labour's statement, 
 
I believe that we have absolutely no excuse with regard to adult basic education 
and training (ABET) and the agreed equity targets especially if we are to address 
the inequalities created by the past apartheid system (DOL 2007a: foreword). 
 
Projecting ahead, and pointing to the relationship between skills development and 
structural features of the economy such as work, the DOL declared that ''It is 
imperative that more Blacks, women and people with disabilities need to be taken 
into learning programmes to ensure that the strategy addresses inequalities in the 
workplaces and economic activities'' (ibid., p. 41). To illustrate further successes and 
failures of the NSDS, some statistics about Black low-skilled, unemployed adults and 
youth in (1) learnerships (2001-2005) and (2) learning programmes (2005-2007) and 
their access to the labour market and employment are given below. 
 




A system of skills development, including learnerships, learning programmes and 
skills programmes was created by the government in 2001. The enrolment target 
2001-2010 was set at 125,000 unemployed learners in learning programmes. 
Learnerships targeted both employed and unemployed learners. 
 
By March 2005, 134,223 learnership agreements were registered, of which 45,813 
concerned employed workers (DOL 2005, p. 49) and almost twice as many, 88,410, 
concerned unemployed learners (ibid., p. 48). Given these enrolment figures, it is 
clear that access to skills development programmes has created new opportunities 
among employed and unemployed people. Learnerships have contributed to reducing 
inequalities in access to skills development opportunities for the unemployed. 
Nevertheless, given the extensive needs, and the limited scale of such access, it is clear 
that inequalities among designated groups persist and that the original target was 
conservative. In this regard, the DOL admitted that 
 
Achieving equity targets continues to be a challenge for the implementation of the 
NSDS. In particular none of the disability targets are currently being met in areas 
where Black people have historically been disadvantaged (e.g. in structured 
learning opportunities and completion of apprenticeships) and similarly women 
are also still excluded from apprenticeship and, to some extent, other learning 
opportunities (DOL 2003, p. 52). 
 
Completion rates are a matter of concern. By March 2002, 315,836 workers were 
registered in structured learning programmes, which include learnerships and 
apprenticeships. Of these, only 50,683 (16%) had completed their training by 2003 
(ibid., p. 17), and by March 2003, 4,008 learners, comprising 1,470 unemployed and 
2,538 employed learners out of the 25,341 registered learnership agreements 
completed their learnerships. A discussion of completion rates during the years 
2005-2007 in the next section provides further insights. 
 
Learning programmes 2005-2007: access and success, impact 
 
Statistics for enrolments and completions in learning programmes in the years 
2005-2007 are instructive in understanding access and success. It is important to 
note that during the implementation of NSDS II (2005-2010), the DOL expanded the 
category ''structured learning programmes'' to include skills programmes as well 
(DOL 2006b, p. 23). This category does not enable us to assess the impact of the 
differentiated learning opportunities provided for Black, low-skilled and unemployed 
adults and youth. It should however be noted that some statistics do also distinguish 
between these categories. 
 
To illustrate the above, taking for example the years 2005-2007, the evidence about 
the low completion rates among unemployed people is revealing and alarming. 
According to the DOL, only 16,507 out of 87,687 of the registered unemployed 
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learners in learning programmes, mostly unemployed youth, completed their training 
from April 2005 to March 2007. In response, the DOL remarked that, ''The challenge 
is that the completion rate is still low at 19%'' (DOL 2007a, p. 30). Further statistics 
show that of the total number of unemployed in learning programmes over the period 
2005 to 2007, 
 
79% were Blacks, 46% women, 3% people with disabilities and 69% youth. 
Of those completing learning programmes, 72% were Blacks, 32% women, 
2% people with disabilities and 59% youth (ibid., p. 30). 
 
Despite the low completion rates, as stated earlier, it is important to recognise that 
the transition from the apartheid political economy, the development of non-racial 
policies and systems, and the creation of new resources have enabled Black, low- 
skilled and unemployed adults and youth to access skills development programmes. 
In my view, low completion rates may be attributed to several structural and 
pedagogical barriers. (1) Learners may enter these skills development programmes 
with lower levels of academic skills, literacy and numeracy than those assumed for 
success; (2) the skills development programmes may not match their prior learning 
experiences; (3) academic support for learners may not be available; (4) stipends may 
not be sufficient to cover all costs that can enable Black, low-skilled and unemployed 
adults and youth to access skills development opportunities; and (5) low numbers are 
targeted for skills development programmes. 
 
My identification of these barriers is substantiated by research findings. Funding and 
finances feature prominently as an institutional barrier: lack of government financial 
support (HRSDC/CMEC 1997); lack of transportation support services (e.g. 
reduced-cost bus pass, and the resulting lower cost of getting to and from educational 
activities) (Millar and Falk 2000; OECD 2002; U.S. Department of Education 1998); 
lack of adequate childcare services and financial support to pay for such services 
(McGivney 1999; OECD 2002; Myers and De Broucker 2006, p. 30, pp. 41-44); lack 
of public funding to support the learning activities of learners with low and middle 
incomes (Lowe 2001); declining overall social support spending resulting in 
government training funds being focused on the unemployed (HRDC/ CMEC 1997); 
and costs of registering and purchasing learning materials (Potter and Ferguson 
2003). Moreover, a lack of ''external support (i.e. from employers or government), 
especially for disadvantaged groups, is a significant barrier to participation in AET'' 
(Desjardins et al. 2006, p. 105).11 
 
Given these barriers, the following changes could be made by the government to 
improve the completion rates: 
 
                                            
11
 AET stands for Adult Education and Training. 
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(1) provide school-leaving qualifications tailored to the needs of Black, low- skilled 
and unemployed adults and youth; 
(2) provide a ''living wage''; and a ''tuition fee waiver'' for Black, low-skilled and 
unemployed adults and youth to complete or improve their school-leaving 
qualifications so that they are academically more prepared to study in skills 
development programmes; 
(3) integrate skills development programmes into a qualifications/career pathway so 
that these are not regarded as ''training skilled cheap labour''. 
 
Structural changes are also imperative. Socio-economic and political structures 
should be transformed more radically in order to address, more fundamentally, the 
structural barriers to skills development, such as policy, funding and systems of 
delivery. The DOL and the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) 
should change policies in ways to prioritise the skills development needs of Black, 
low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth. The DOL, the DHET, the SETAs and 
various other institutions should make more funding available to cover learners' costs 
such as transport, childcare, and supplementary income grants. These institutions 
should also change systems of delivery in order to provide skills development 
programmes during the day and in the evenings in schools and in other vacant public 
and private community buildings. 
 
In summary, promises about addressing structural racial inequalities were made, a 
new system of skills development was implemented, yet the evidence shows that 
structural racial inequalities persist. Evidence in the data from the DOL reports 
illustrates that for designated groups and the unemployed access to skills 
development has been created, participation has increased, but success has been 
limited. So far, this analysis of the relationship between skills development and 
inequality reveals that skills development in South Africa under post-apartheid 
capitalism is redressing some inequalities, albeit to an extremely limited extent, while 
still reproducing apartheid inequalities, and creating new inequalities. 
 
Skills development and access to the labour market for designated 
groups 
Promises and equity targets 
Promises were made to employed workers ''to improve the quality of life of workers, 
their prospects of work and labour mobility''; and to the unemployed, ''to encourage 
employers to provide opportunities for new entrants to the labour market to gain 
work experience''; ''to promote self-employment''; ''to employ persons who find it 
difficult to be employed''; ''to assist work-seekers to find work''; '''to assist retrenched 
workers to re-enter the labour market'' and ''to improve the employment prospects of 
persons previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination'' (DOL 1998, pp. 4-5). The 
most critical issue is that promises of equity are based on the assumption that ''the 
market'' is an active player in providing or redistributing employment opportunities 




The promise of employability is explicit in the relationship between skills 
development, the labour market and work. This is conveyed in the DOL's statements, 
''The NSDS is aimed at addressing the structural problems of the labour market 
inherited from the past, and aimed at transforming the South African labour market 
from one with a low skills base to one characterised by rising skills and a commitment 
to lifelong learning'' (DOL 2004, p. 1); and ''Transformation remains at the forefront 
of all skills development activities so as to create employment opportunities for 
previously disadvantaged communities of our country'' (DOL 2006b, p. 32). The DOL 
emphasises the promise of equity as an economic gain in the following statements: 
''Ensuring equity in skills development is also critical to addressing the skills 
constraints that are faced by the South African economy'' (DOL 2003, p. 48); and 
''Equity is an essential principle for the transformation of economic relations broadly, 
education and training more specifically, and for ensuring that the legacy of apartheid 
is addressed'' (ibid., p. 48). 
 
Access to employment: impact 
According to the Skills Development Act (DOL 1998), skills development is intended 
to redress the inequalities in skills development for adults in order for them to access 
employment and income opportunities. These (promises expressed in) intentions of 
the Act are given in Objective 4 of the NSDS, ''Assisting designated groups, including 
new entrants to participate in accredited work, integrated learning and work-based 
programmes to acquire critical skills to enter the labour market and 
self-employment'' (DOL 2006b, p. iii). In this way the policy has projected skills 
development as a vehicle to address ''the structural problems of the labour market 
inherited from the past'' (DOL 2003, p. 1). 
 
Entry level skills 
The litmus test for assessing the success of learnerships is to establish whether people 
find employment. According to the DOL, statistics provided by the SETAs in this 
regard are biased as they tend to report on best practice only. These statistics show 
that among the SETAs, there is an overall average of 79 per cent for successful 
placement into employment, while the Financial and Accounting Services Sector 
Education and Training (FASSET) SETA has recorded 100 per cent (Butcher 2007) 
and the Wholesale and Retail Learnership with Shoprite and Checkers12 indicates a 
placement rate of 100 per cent (DOL 2007b, p. 31). These figures seem to point to a 
high degree of success. 
 
Evidence does indicate that some learnerships have served as a vehicle for access to 
employment, provided that employment is available to absorb new entrants. 
Furthermore, if employment opportunities are available, and they match the skills 
development in the respective learnership, then it is possible that learnerships can 
                                            
12
 Shoprite and Checkers are South Africa's two biggest food retailers. 
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provide access to employment for Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and 
youth, and those in designated groups, thus redressing inequalities. 
 
If people succeed in equipping themselves with skills for employment through 
learnerships, but are then unable to access employment, success of/in skills 
development would be evident in the increase of a larger pool of higher-skilled people 
who have qualifications. According to the most recent Labour Force Survey there 
were 4,336 million unemployed people in March 2007 (Statistics South Africa 2007, 
p. iii). As stated earlier, only 16,507, mostly unemployed youth (i.e. 18.8 %), of the 
87,687 registered learners completed learning programmes between 2005 and 2007. 
Although a high rate of placement in employment was reported as best practice, the 
low completion rates with regard to learnerships do not hold promise for a significant 
contribution on the scale which is required to address the need for employment 
among 4,336 million unemployed people. These statistics reveal that while 
learnerships for Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth do present 
opportunities for access to low-skilled employment, the potential for impacting 





Renee Grawitzky's investigation into the implementation of learnerships, commis-
sioned by the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) located at the University of 
Cape Town, provides the following explanations, 
 
A large number of the learnerships have been initiated at the lower (NQF level 1) 
rather than intermediary skills levels. This might partly be a result of a drive by 
government to meet specific targets to employ unemployed youth. (It could also be 
a way of employing cheap labour, which has occurred and had led to the 
displacement of permanently employed workers). If that is the case, then the 
system has not had the desired effect of increasing the level of skills at the 
intermediary to higher levels of the skills spectrum (Grawitzky 2007, p. 34). 
Since the majority of learnerships are concentrated at the low skills end of the labour 
market, successful completion of learnerships and placement in employment implies 
access to low-skilled, low-paid work. It is unlikely that learnerships located at low 
skills levels can provide access to higher-skilled employment. Given the historical 
legacy of apartheid inequalities in the labour market, in which most high- skilled jobs 
were occupied by White people and almost all low-skilled jobs by Black people, and 
the low success rate in learnerships, there seems a slim chance that learnerships 
could enable upward mobility for Black people into higher-skilled jobs and higher 
income levels and reach the target of ''halving unemployment and poverty, and 
reducing inequality by 2014'' (DOL 2006b, p. viii).
 
  
Despite the changes discussed above, it is evident that skills development is 
addressing employment and income inequalities in a limited way. There are no 
available comprehensive statistics to show the relationship between skills devel-
opment and structural racial inequalities related to employment/unemployment and 
income in relation to class, race and gender. However, for extrapolation and 
inference, it is possible to discern broad trends in emerging statistics which indicate 
the persistence of apartheid structural class, race and gender inequalities in the 
distribution of employment, division of labour and income. They mirror the trends 
and patterns identifiable in the evidence on the limited impact of learnerships and 
learning programmes on national unemployment among Black, low-skilled and 
unemployed adults and youth. 
 
Unemployment 
Mayer and Altman argue that the unemployment rate which has risen from 20 per 
cent in 1994 to 30.5 per cent in 2002, especially among unskilled African workers, has 
contributed to an increase in poverty and inequality during the democratic era 
(Mayer and Altman 2005, p. 42). Government statistics show that in March 2007, the 
unemployment rate among Black Africans was 30.2 per cent, as against 19.8 per cent 
among coloured people, 13.8 per cent among Indians/Asians, and 4.3 per cent among 
White people (Statistics South Africa 2007, p. xv). Orkin concludes that these racial 
inequalities reflected in statistics on unemployment in 2007 do not reflect major 
changes according to the trends evident in 1994-1995 (Orkin 1996, p. 15). 
 
Gender inequalities are also discernible in the unemployment figures for 20062007, 
which indicate that Black African women continue to be most disadvantaged with 
respect to employment: Black African (36.4%); Coloured (22.7%); Indian/ Asian 
(17.9%); White (4.6%). Similar trends are evident among men: Black African (25.0%); 
Coloured (16.9%); Indian/Asian (11.3%); White (4.1%) (Statistics South Africa 2007, 
p. xvi). 
 
Oeindrila Dube et al., quoting Abhijit Banerjee, reveal that ''South Africa's 
unemployment rate [...] stands today at 26 percent [...] which excludes discouraged 
workers [...]. The unemployment rate including discouraged workers is 40 percent,  
which is one of the highest in the world'' (Dube et al. 2007, p. 8). According to Dube et 
al., ''[...] the rate has risen from 12 to 23 percent for men and from 21 to 32 percent for 
women, over 1995 to 2005'' (ibid., p. 8).13 
 
If learnerships and learning programmes are directed at redressing structural racial 
inequalities related to unemployment, and their successes at arresting increasing 
unemployment are limited, then the DOL, DHET and other institutions must improve 
these initiatives, reduce the expectations of these initiatives in terms of 
                                            
13
 In the third quarter of 2013 Statistics South Africa established the unemployment rate at 24.7 per cent of a total population of 51.8 million according 
to the Population Census 2011. See http://beta2.statssa. gov.za/, accessed 15 January 2014. 
  
unemployment, and find other ways of addressing unemployment in more 
fundamental ways. 
 
Post-apartheid capitalism and its limitations for redressing apartheid 
structural racial inequality in terms of skills development and 
employment 
Despite limited successes, the DOL continues to assert that ''Transformation remains 
at the forefront of all skills development activities so as to create employment 
opportunities for previously disadvantaged communities of our country'' (DOL 
2006b). As critics highlighted the limitations of liberal democratic capitalism for 
redressing apartheid structural racial inequalities, social democracy was proposed, 
and found expression in the government's Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for 
South Africa (ASGI-SA) established in 2006.14 Through the ASGI-SA the government 
prioritised skills development as follows, ''Finally, the sixth objective is to raise the 
coordination between skills needs and skills supply, through immigration reform, and 
improvements in training programs and in the quality of [the] educational system'' 
(Dube et al. 2007, p. 2). 
 
Dube et al. argue that ''Skills act as a binding constraint to economic growth'' (ibid., p. 
27). The relationship between skills demand, shrinking sectors in the economy and 
structural unemployment is illuminated by their analysis of structural changes in the 
''non-mineral tradables (including manufacturing) sector'' (ibid., p. 11). Stating as a 
starting-point that ''most of the unemployment is in fact structural'' (ibid., p. 39), they 
claim that the non-mineral tradables sectors (including manufacturing) ''are 
relatively intensive in the use of unskilled labor in comparison to other sectors of the 
economy'' (ibid., p. 12), but point out that ''changes in the sectoral composition of the 
South African economy have lowered the relative demand for unskilled labour'' [...] 
''resulting in high unemployment rates for these workers. and favored skilled 
workers'' (ibid., p. 33). 
 
If skills act as a binding constraint to economic growth, then unskilled labour will 
undermine economic growth, and have limited opportunities to employment, while 
skilled labour will be privileged. Given that Black and White people constitute most of 
the unskilled and skilled labour respectively, a reproduction of structural racial 
inequalities could be implied. 
 
If there is less demand for unskilled labour, why should the unskilled be afforded 
skills development opportunities? Is skills development, in this instance, a mere 
political appeasement, or is it an authentic attempt to re-skill unskilled labour? The 
width, depth and pace of change in terms of skills development and its contribution to 
addressing unemployment will be determined by the developments in the broader 
socio-economic and political context. Be that as it may, the limited successes in 
                                            
14 The Accelerated Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA) was implemented by the South African government 
in 2006 to address the second economy as identified by then-President Mbeki in 2003. See footnote 4 for further explanation. 
  
redressing inequalities in skills development opportunities as such, and as a strategy 
to redress unemployment and various other inequalities, prompt further thinking. 
 
The logic underpinning the government's initiatives in terms of skills development is 
that the latter would provide opportunities for employment and in this way redress 
income inequality. If employment however is not available, then skills development 
will fail to redress racial income inequality and unemployment will remain a driver of 
this inequality. Several studies, including those by Bhorat et al. (2002), DPRU (2010), 
Leite et al. (2006), Leibrandt et al. (2005), Seekings et al. (2004), Seekings and 
Nattrass (2005) and Seekings (2007), have investigated changes in income during the 
post-1994 period and provide evidence that racial inequalities endure in the changes 
in income inequality. Analysing various datasets over the years 1995 to 2005, the 
Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) found that ''Generally the inequality 
measures show that income inequality has increased considerably across race groups 
over the period under discussion'' (DPRU 2010, p. 4). Philippe Leite et al. concur, 
arguing that earnings inequality during the period 1995 to 2004 ''rose sharply initially 
and then fell marginally'' (Leite et al. 2006, p. 25). Reporting on post-1994 research, 
Gelb declared that, 
 
Not surprisingly, race is a significant determinant of both poverty and inequality. 
Based on a household poverty line of US$220 per month in 1999, 54% of the 
African population was poor while 95% of poor people were African, though 
Africans were only 79% of the population as a whole (Gelb 2003, p. 4). 
 
Contrary to promise and expectation, the DPRU reported that ''An unexpected result 
was that income inequality between race groups, rather than income inequality 
within race groups, was the leading cause of the increasing levels of income 
inequality'' (DPRU 2010, p. 12). 
 
Given the rise in unemployment, the increase in income inequalities, the limited 
access to and low participation and completion rates in skills development 
programmes, the evidence suggests that skills development has made a limited 
contribution to transforming skills development as such and redressing structural 
racial inequalities related to employment and income for Black, low-skilled and 
unemployed adults and youth. The logic of the promise that skills development will 
enable Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth to develop skills, become 
employed and secure income is thus in question. In fact, the harsh reality is that while 
the government's initiatives to redress inequalities have unfolded, South Africa has 
become the most unequal society in the world. 
 
Despite those structural changes which have already taken place, it is clear that the 
structural racial inequality which was created by apartheid persists. The scale of 
structural racial inequalities in South African society is wide and deep. So what does 
the persistence of these inequalities reveal about redressing inequalities in a post- 
  
apartheid context? Saul Gelb (2003) and Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass (2005) 
provide insights into some complexities which should be taken into account. In his 
research, Gelb (2003, p. 7) discerns relationships among inequalities; among adult 
basic education, income inequality, poverty, class, race and gender. His notion of 
''multiple interlocking inequalities'' is a useful construct for further analysing the 
relationship between skills development and multiple inequalities. Seekings and 
Nattrass, focusing specifically on income inequality, comment on the complexity of 
studying inequality, stating that, ''The South African case illustrates how labour 
market, welfare, education, and economic policies combined to structure the pattern 
of income in society, sometimes exacerbating inequality, at other times reducing it'' 
(Seekings and Nattrass 2005, p. 4). Quite clearly, further studies on inequality in the 
direction of a more comprehensive political and economic analysis of inequality are 
required for an understanding of inequalities related to skills development and 
employment, and the relationship between skills development, employment and 
inequalities.
 
Reflecting on the arguments presented thus far, there seems to be a paradox - that 
post-apartheid capitalism has enabled de-racialisation which created some 
possibilities for skills development to redress some inequalities related to the access 
of historically-disadvantaged Black people to learning opportunities, yet at the same 
time preserved historical racially-determined structural unemployment, which limits 
the possibilities for skills development to redress inequalities related to the access of 
many historically-disadvantaged Black people into employment. Two questions come 
to mind: (1) Can post-apartheid capitalism, in all its manifestations, redress the 
structural racial inequalities created by the apartheid capitalist political economy as 
described by Wolpe, Saul and Gelb in the 1980s? and (2) Can post-apartheid 
capitalism transform the lives of Black, low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth 
in radical ways? 
 
Reflecting on transitions to post-apartheid capitalism, it becomes clear that the South 
African government has implemented various changes to de-racialise post- apartheid 
capitalism. Nevertheless, and given the current conditions, further questions arise: 
(3) Is it possible that the changes are not far-reaching enough to de-racialise 
post-apartheid capitalism in order to redress the structural racial inequalities created 
by apartheid which limit the possibilities of transforming the lives of Black, 
low-skilled and unemployed adults and youth? Is there any hope in Wolpe's thesis 
that capitalism and racism are contingent upon one another, and that capitalism can 
be de-racialised (Wolpe 1988)? (4) Or does the persistence of structural racial 
inequalities indicate a contradictory relationship between capitalism and racial 
domination, and that post-apartheid capitalism in South Africa should be dismantled 
in order to de-racialise it, as Saul and Gelb (1986) argued in the 1980s? In his current 






Debates about structural reform started in the early 1990s and are gaining 
momentum. Focusing specifically on central issues of this article, I pose yet another 
question, ''What are the possibilities that structural reform can transform post- 
apartheid capitalism in ways that provide opportunities of skills development and 
employment which radically transform the lives of Black, low-skilled and unemployed 
adults and youth?'' The following statement by Saul and Gelb provides a theoretical 
point of departure: ''As Gelb and I argued, such problematic features link up, in turn, 
with constraints upon growth specific to South Africa's own racially structured brand 
of capitalism: the very pattern of racial stratification that has, historically, made 
cheap labour so readily available'' (Saul and Gelb 1986, p. 217). 
 
Of pertinence is Jacob Dlamini's reference to Saul's expression of the aim of 
structural reform ''to deal with the structure of the South African economy'' (Dlamini 
2011, p. 39). In the early 1990s Saul anticipated the limitations of the social transition 
and social transformation that would emerge from negotiations and urged a ''focus, 
instead, on the attempts by many militants to think about structural reform'' or a 
''future beyond the interregnum that begins to redress South Africa's severe 
socio-economic inequalities'' (Saul 1992, p. 3). At present, there is much debate about  
 
the meaning of reform. Saul draws on the work of Andre Gorz (1973) and points out 
that 
 
Gorz makes a key distinction between a ''genuinely socialist policy of reforms on 
the one hand [and] reformism of a neo-capitalist or 'social democratic' type'' on the 
other. He writes that ''If [most often] immediate socialism is not possible, neither 
is the achievement of reforms directly destructive of capitalism. [Yet] those who 
reject all lesser reforms on the grounds that they are merely reformist are in fact 
rejecting the whole possibility of a transitional strategy and of a process of 
transition to socialism (Saul 2010, p. 181). 
 
The radical and organic nature of structural reform is revealed in Saul's articulations 
of the distinctions between ''structural reform'' and ''mere reformism''. As a way 
forward, Saul describes the key attributes of ''structural reform'' as follows: 
any reform, to be structural [. ] must instead be allowed self-consciously to implicate 
other ''necessary'' reforms that flow from it as part of an emerging and on-going 
project of structural transformation in a left-ward direction. Secondly, a structural 
reform must root itself in popular initiatives in such a way as to leave a residue of 
further empowerment (ibid., p. 181). 
 
Conclusions 
Let me return to the question posed in the introduction, ''What possibilities and 




capitalism created for redressing structural racial inequalities in terms of skills 
development and unemployment?'' 
 
After due consideration, we may conclude that some political and economic changes 
during the course of the transitions have created some possibilities to redress some 
structural racial inequalities in terms of skills development and unemployment. 
Limitations however are evident as well, which suggests that further de-racialisation 
and structural reform of post-apartheid capitalism are imperative to create greater 
possibilities for redressing structural inequalities in terms of skills development and 
unemployment on a larger scale. 
 
At this particular historical juncture we are confronted with the following 
conundrum: Can further structural changes de-racialise capitalism and enable the 
government to redress structural racial inequalities created by apartheid? Or should 
capitalism be dismantled in order to de-racialise it and enable the government to 
redress structural racial inequalities created by apartheid? Only the future can tell! As 
the debates about structural reform ensue and the political and economic conditions 
become favourable for structural reform, possibilities may emerge for redressing 
structural racial inequalities in radical ways. 
 
As the future unfolds, let us bear in mind the late Nelson Mandela's statement in the 
preface to the White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, 
My government's commitment to create a people-centred society of liberty binds us to 
the pursuit of the goals of freedom from want, freedom from 
hunger, freedom from deprivation, freedom from ignorance, freedom from 
suppression, and freedom from fear. These freedoms are fundamental to the 
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